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TOe importance of pragmatic aspects in conditional reosoning was assessed in te
performance of 54 subjecís (26 feniale and 28 míe: mean age 17.6 years) oIl 48 conditional
inference problerns, using a 3 x 2 x 4 design. with repeated measurements. The independent
variables were probabiLity of empirical frequency in dic real world, type of conditional
rule, and scenario availability. Number of correct responses aud subjects’ eertainty about
tite correctness of Iheir responses were tOe dependcnt variables. Tbe results showed: a)
tOe scenario availability Ls nol sufficient in itself lo explain difíerences in performance,
but it does affect Ihe suhjecis’ degree of confidence jo thcir conclusions; b) diere ís an
interaction between probability of empirical frequency jo tOe real world and type of
conditional rule on corred performance. Thc results wcre contrasted with the predietions
made by the mental models theory and its revised version proposed by Evans (1993).
These findings support the semantic Iheories of conditional reasoning.
Xc~ words: ¡~ragn;axir: ~-casoning, conditional reasoning. cni~~irical re/cuan bc’tween
aoteccdcnt cad co/tse quetit, availabiliiv of thescenarw
En este trabajo hemos estudiado la importancia de factores pragmáticos en razonamiento
condicional, analizando la ejecución de 54 sujetos ~26mujeres - 28 hombres, cuya media
de edad era de 17.6 años). Planteamos un diseño 3 x 2 x 4 de medidas repetidas en
los tres factores. Las variables manipuladas fueron: la relación empirica existente en el
mundo, el tipo de regla y la accesibilidad del escenario. Se utilizaron como variables
dependientes el número de respuestas correctas y la seguridad de los sujetos en la
corrección de sus juicios. Los resultados han puesto de manifiesto que: a) la accesibilidad
del escenario no es en sí misma suficiente para explicar las diferencias en la ejecución,
pero afecta al grado de seguridad de los sujetos en sus conclusiones; b) hay una
interacción entre probabilidad de frecuencia empírica en el mundo real y el tipo de norma
lógica sobre la ejecución correcta. Contrastamos ¡os resultados con las predicciones de
la teoría de modelos mentales y con [aversiónrevisada (Evans, 1993). Los datos apoyan
las teorías semánticas del razonamiento condicional.
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entre antecedente y consecuente, accesibilidad del escenario
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PRAGMAT1C ASPECTS IN CON[)ITIONAL REASONINO
There is now considerable empirical evidence that human
reasoning with conditional sentences (cg., it Muzzv ¿5 0001,
dita Mu2zv has four legs) ¡5 influenced by concrete oc
thematic contcnt (Holyoak & Cheng. 1995a, 1995b).
Specifícal¡y, prexious work has established thai distinel types
of content evoke distiner inference patterns on thc Wason
selection task, the most investigated problem in thc psychology
of reasoning (Valiña, Scoane, Ferraces, & Martín, 1998; see
Evans, Ncwstead, & Byrne, 993, br a detailed review).
Comparatively few studies have investigated hnw people
reasoned with different typcs of realistie contení (but see
Newstead, Ellis, Evans, & Dennis, 1997). The main
contribution of this paper is, precisely, to investigate in more
detail the effects of the subject’s knowledge about problcms
of each rule of propositional logic (Modus Paneas ¡MP],
Modus Tollens [Mi], Aftirníation of the Consequent [ACi,
and Denial of /1w Antecedcnt [DA]).
la a previous cxpcrimcnt (Martín, ¡996; Valifla, Seoane,
Ferraces, & M~irtín, 1996a), <Uree versions of Wason’s
selection task were presental to the subjects (Wason, ¡966,
1968), with three íypes of content (abstraer, thematic-
perrnIsslon, and thematic-obligation). Tbe resulis of ihis
experiment revealed the importance of facíors related to
knowledge when executing a meta-inference task, such as
the Wason selection task. This effect conid not be understood
as a mere facilitation of concrete content, faced with the
abstract coníent of the rule. In fact, we registered better
performance in subjects when using the versions which
included a deontic relation (enunciative conditionais that
contain deontic terms such as the imperative modal must
see Mankíelow & Over. 1991), both in abstract aud thematic
content (cg., ¡fa Wasit card lías A on ant sitie, tuca it mus!
Izave a 3 cnt tite otiter or if a person rides a ,notorbike, dita
he oc site ,nu.st wear a hehnefl. Hesides, we obtained the
worst resulis with the rule, using thematic content, which
expressed a relation of possibility or permission (e.g., ifa
person is more than 18 years oid, then he oc site lías tize
right fo vote).
The proposals of ihe theory of pragmatie reasoning
sehemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989; Cheng. Holyoak,
Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986; l-lolyoak & Cheng, 1995a, b; Valifla,
In press) could explain this improvement in reasoning. Frorn
Ibis perspective, in the two tasks thaI regisíered a higher
number of correct answers, the subjects used a schema similar
lo that of ‘obligation” Ql the precondition is satisfied, titen
tite action ,nusr be carried ant). Howevcr, this theoretica¡
proposal does not Iully explain other results, such as the
differences in performance between the two theniatic versíons,
both similar lo a pragmaíic sehema, either of obligation
(“thematic-2~) oc of permission (“Ihematic-1~: u Ihe
precottditioit ¿5 satís/wd, titen tite action ntay be carried att!).
However, using the íheory of mental models (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, ¡991), it is possible
to predict and explain the performance differences between
conditionals which express a deontie relation of “necessity”
and conditionals which present a mere “possibility “. In this
respect, as Byrne & Johnson-Laird (1992; see also Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1992) indicated, the “deontic framework’
or “epistemie’ of thc conditional relation may be modulating
ihe subjects’ reasoning.
The results of Valiña et al. (1996a) only permilted
verifying the influence of the necessity nature of a condilional
relation when ¡he subjects were reasoning aboní a meta-
inference task, such as Ihe selection task. 1-lowever, could
this influence be generalized ro other conditional inference
tasks? Wc designed this experiment to answer this question.
Our interesí in Ihis experimení was not, therefore, to
analyze the influence of the content (abstraer vs. thematic)
on the subjects’ conditional reasoning, as this has been dealt
with previously (Seoane & Valiña, 1988; Valiña, Seoane,
Ferraces, & Martín, 1995; Valifla, Seoane, Gehring, Fenaces,
& Fernández-Rey, 1992; Valiña, Scoanc, Martín, Fernández-
Rey, & Ferraces, 1992). In fact, we only used conditional
arguments, with ihematieeonteut, as experimental material.
Questions abouí the possihle effect of thematic facilitation
have generated abundant experimental investigation in the
Iast Iwenty years, but this topie is now practically spent,
given that, as we previously indicated, the influence of
knowledge on pragmatic reasoning is more complex than
that of mere facilitation of thematic versus abstract content
(Valifla, Seoane, Ferraces, & Martín, 1996b).
In this experiment, we tried to determine the precise
importance of the variable that we calI the probability of
empirical frequency in conditional reasoning (Valiña, Seoane,
Gehring, et al., 1992; Valiña. Seoane, Martín, et al., 1992).
This refers to the frequency with which the expressed relation
(between antecedent and consequent in condilional statements)
occurs in the real world. This offers three leveis, which refer
to the degree of empirical occurrence: deterministie,
probabilisrio, and wñhout spectjfic relation. In this respect,
we considered the delerministie relation similar to a relation
of entpirical necessiíy (the relation expressed in the
conditional statement will always happen, for example: If
tlíe docker throws a piumb itt/o tite ~vaten tiw,í tite plumb
wiii sink); whereas the probabilistie relation presents an
enípirical possibility (which only happens sornelimes in the
real world, for example: if tite farater gets wet, the>í he wili
c.atclt a caíd).
lf, as posiled hy the theory of mental modeh., reasoning
subjects elaborate analogical representations of the real world,
then one would expect that reasoning wiíh conditional
statements in which empirical possibilities are expressed will
be difíerení from reasoning involving statements which
present empirical necessities. More precisely, and in
agreement with Johnson-Lairds proposais (Byme & Johnson-
Laird, 1992; Johnson-Laird & Byme, 1992), reasoning about
a neeessary argument requires the elaborarion of a unique,
explicit mental model of the situation. However. if the
situation concerns a probable conditional statement, Ihat may
or may not occur in the real world, then il would be necessary
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to elaborate both an explicit and an implicit mental model.
Therefore, we expected the subjects to manifest more conect
reasoníng with conditional síatemenís. in which Ihey
expressed a necessary (deterministic) relation, than if the
relation was possible (probabilistie). In ihe latíer case, ihe
number of mental models needed to arrive at the conclusion
was grealer, which led to an increase in the working memory
workload, and, finally, an mercase in Wc number of errors.
We also manipulated two more variables: type of
conditional rule aud availability. The first had four levels,
corresponding to the four types of conditional inference rules
from propositional logie.
The manipulation of the type of rule variable allowed us
to see whether our resulís would support the predictions of
the theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird & I3yrne, 1991). or those of its revised version (Evans,
1993), developed within the Irarnework of Fvans’s theory of
heuristic-analytic processes (Evans. 1982, 1984, 1989).
According to Johnson-Laird (1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne,
1991), MP for condilionals requires only one explicit model
and one implicit model. Subjects focus iheir altention on the
initial explicit model aud. from Ihere, immediaíely generate
the conclusion. Qn the other hand, when faced with MT
problems, the subjects would not be able to generale the
conclusion directly from the explicil model, but by developing
the possihle implicil models instead. Regarding the níinor
MT premise, reasoning with tbis rule requires the subjects lo
generale the conclusion by the elaboration of three models.
The number of mental models needed for MT is greater than
for the MP rule. This implies that the operalive memory
workload would be greater, and accordingly, performance
would be worse.
Evans (1993) agreed partially with Johnson-LairrLs
theory (1983; Johnson-Laird & Byme, 1991), but considered
that in the original version, there was no clear explanation
of how the subjects elaborated the models when they weue
required to reason about MT problems. In Ihe revised version
of the theory of mental models. ibis auíhor proposed that
¡he subjects start elaborating aH initial representation, Ihat
inclu(tes a complete representation of the affirmative values.
but only an implicit representalion of <he negative values.
According to this author, ‘subjects may draw inferences
cuitee if the premise is exhaustively represenied iii Ihe currení
model, or if alí models in which it occurs are explicitly
represented (Pl principIe, Evans. 1993, p. 7). The MP
inference is adjusíed to the previous principIe, but not to
thai of MT, because the premise not q wasn’t totally
represented. Therefore, subjects would try to develup an
implicil model. However. they might or niight nol be
successful, and so, could generate or fail to generate the
correct inference.
The mental models theory proposes that in MP and Al?
inferences, subjecís reason from the initial representation.
in which Ihere is no explicit model to serve as a counter-
example, to ihe inference. Thus, Johnson-Laird predicts thaI
subjecís will elaborate boíh MP and Al? inferences with
eqtial frequency, “even if stihjecís represent the conditional
wiíh exhaustive categories but an implicit model” (Evans.
1993, p. 5).
Nevertheless. ihe evised version of thc íheory proposes
that suhjecís will draw MP inlérences wiíh grealer frequency
than Al? inferences. In Ibis sense, in the case of MP, subjects
will draw the iníerence both frorn a conditional or
bicondilional representation of the rule, buí they only will
generate [he Al? inferences if they adopt a biconditional
representation with a higher rate of MP inferences than the
Al? ones.
Accordiiíg to the original theory, subjecls made the Al?
inference morc Irequently than the DA because Ihere is an
explicit represeníation of affwmaíive. buí not negalive, values
in the inilial model. Given the minor premise of the DA
argumení. reasoners could acctirately say that nothittg fhiíows
símply because they couldn’t combine the information in the
second premise wiíh ihe initial set of inodeis (regardless of
whcther ihose models were br [he conditional or biconditional
interpretation). So, rcasoners could anive at the right answer
fbr ihe wrong reason. ¡he same prediction followed from Ihe
revised version of ihe theory. but Evans (1993, p. 9), on the
basis of the resulis of the ¡iterature which used inferences
from Ihe affirmative condilionals, pointed out thai the Iwo
inferences were made with roughly equal frequency.
Finally. Ihe third variable we manipulated xvas
availability. Qur aim was lo síudy whether the availability
of a seenario was a sufficient condition (as proposed by
Pollard, 1982) to provoke an improvement in subjects’
reasoning, or w hether, as Evans proposed (1984, 1989,
1995), it cou]d be a necessary but insufficient condition lo
influence reasoníng.
Based on our theoreíical proposals. we propose the
following predictions:
1. l’he factor related tu the suhjects previous knowledge
modulates [he reasoníng process. In this respecí, the greater
the possibiliíy of subjects activating knowledge, the casier
the task will be. As Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1992) and
Johnson-Laird and l3yme (1992, 1994) proposed. reasoning
froni a deontic relation implies ihe elaboration of a unique
mental model. Consequently, we hope to obtain <he highest
number of cor¡cct unswers and greatest ceriainty aboui the
answers when the subjecís reason about deterministie
siatemene.. In the sanie way, the lowesi performance level
and lowesi leveis of certainiy would register in statements
withouí specific relation, where it is nol possible to access
Ihe subjecís’ concelitual sysiem.
2. Reasoning is based on the construction of mental
models or scenarios of ihe situation. llowever, the use of
accessible scenai-ios is not sufticient to improve performance
in a reasoning task. In ihis respecí, and bear¡ng in mmd that
ihe availabiliíy of the seenario thaI we wilI presení is limited
tu includine available professions in decontextualized
reasoning, ~vedo not expecí to register significant principal
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effects of ibis variable (availability) on the number of correct
answers. More specifically, we do not expecí higher
pertbmiance levels when [he subjects reason about arguments
which include available professions, compared to those
which presení unavailable professions.
3. Availability, in itself, is nol a sufficient factor [o
improve performance, and we agree with Pollard and Evan’s
proposal (1987) when they síale thai variables of content-
coníext modulate human reasoning. 1n this respect, we expect
[o register lower numbers of correct answers and less certainty
ahout the answer when Ihe probability of empirical occurrence
expressed in the argumenís is nulí (without-specitic-relation
condition), if the subjects reason about unavailable seenarios.
Also, subjects will teud [o reject the task more often ([he
increase In [he selection of Ihe alternative nothingfbilo¡vs
will reveal this). However, when the subjects reason about
delerministie statements presented in available contexts, we
expect [o register the highest number of correct answers and
grea[est certainty about the answer. In [his case, access [o
the conceptual sysíem is heing facilitated, and the activation
of relevant knowledge will definitively facilitate the
elaboralion of a mental framework lo reason abouí.
Method
Participanis
Fifíy-four school síudenís (26 females and 28 males),
studying at the Rafael Dieste School (A Coruña, Spain),
parlicipated voluntarily in this experiment. The age of the
students ranged from 16 to 20 years (M = 17.6). Subjects
were randornly selecíed and none had any prior tuition in
formal logie.
Desiga
Wc used a 3 x 2 x 4 design (Probability of Occurrence
in the Real World x Availability x Type of Rule), with
repeated measurements in the three fac[ors.
The first factor was probability of empirical occurrence
of the relation between the antecedent aud the consequen[
of each conditional statement. This relation could always
occur in Ihe real world (deterministie), sometimes occur
(probabilistic), or [here could be no specific relation between
aníecedent and consequent (without specific relation).
The second factor was availability, with two levels
(Available and Unavailable). This refers to the type of
profession included in the problem, which in one case was
available [o the subjects (for example, a singer), whereas in
the other, il was unavailable (for example, a soprano).
Finally, [he third factor was the Iype of rule, which
corresponds to [he four types of conditional inference
proposed by prupositional logw: MP, MT, Al?, ant! DA,
As dependent variables, we used: a) <he number of
corree! answers according to Logie and b) [he certainty that
the subjects expressed about [heir answers.
Materíais aud Procedure
Two bookle[s were made up for Ihis investigation. Each
one contained a page of instructions and a total of 48
problems of conditional inference (two per page), of which
16 expressed deterministie relations, which always occur in
[he real world (for example, ¡1 Ihe ‘tun looks al iterseif in
the níirror titen site sees herselí re/lected), 16 contained
prohabilistie statements which occur sometimes (for example,
if rize Inilíer sníokes a lot, then he wiii itave iung cancer)
and, finally, 16 itenis which contained conditional .sta[ements
where [here was no specific relation betwecn thc antecedent
and the consequent (for example, ~ tite sculptor ciils itis itai~
the,í ite lviii ge! inarried). We used [he conditional sta[ements
from a previous normative study (Martín & Valiña, 1993).
We manipulated [he degree of availability of [he content,
selecting [he professions of [he characters in it, which were
included in tlie premises. In eight items, these characters
had an available profession for Ihe subjects (for example,
if tite workma,í laus fro,n tite te,tth floon the,í he wili hurt
Itinísel!), whereas in the other eight iíems, we presented an
unavailable profession (br example, if the piasterer fi/ls
/Pont lite tenílí /Ioor titen he wili kurt líimse4Q. We used,
with conditional argumenís, characters with available
professions (e.g., singer, philosopher, clown, biologist,
workman, etc.), and unavailable professions (e.g.. soprano,
axiologisí. tightrope-walker, rnalacologist, plasíerer, etc.)
selected from a previous standardized study, which had been
used in a series of experiments based on the study of
syllogistic reasoning, with quantifiers of natural language
(Valiña, 1988), including syllogisms in narrative texts (Val jíja
¡985; Valiña & de Vega, 1988).
Finally, xve included two problems of each rule of
Propositional Logie for both types of conten[ (2 MP, 2 MT,
2 Al?, and 2 DA for available, as well as for unavailable
professions). The problems were randomized ant! their order
of preseníation iii [he booklets was random and inverse
random.
ihe experimental paradigm used was an answer-selecíion
paradigm. The task of Ihe subjects was [o select [he
conclusion that was logically deduced from [he premises.
Also, they had [o mark witl) a cross, On a seven-point seale,
the degree of cerl.ainty that they felt about the correctness
of [heir choice. This seale ranged from itol at ah sure [O
contpíetelv sure, with a neutral iníermediate score.
Wc carried ouí [he experiment in [he classroom where
Ihe síudents normally had lessons. AII the subjects sal at
separate desks and they alí did [he same task. We handed
them wriíten ins[ructions and we also real [hese insíructions
aloud; afterwards, Wc cleared up any doubts [bey had.
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The instructions were:
In [bis booklet you have a series of sentence pairs. The
first are of [he ‘1/ ..., the,t’ type. These two sentences are
always considered [o be true. Afier each of [hese pairs of
sentences you will find a series of [hree statements. Your
task is to point out which of Ihese statemenls, at your
discretion, 5 deduced logically from [he former ones. lf you
tliink [bat there is one [hat is Iogically corred, <ben you
should circle its number. lf you think that none of the
sentences can be logically deduced from the former pair,
then cirele [he number corresponding to No conclusion Ls
deduced. Apart from this, you mus[ also indicate how sure
you feel about your choice. You have alí the time you
consider necessary for [his. Make sure you understand what
you have to do.
Half of the subjects, randomly selected, received a
booklet with [he itenis presented in random order, and [he
other half received ano[her booklet with Ihe tenis in inverse
random order.
Once we read the instructions and we cleared np any
doubts, [he subjects carried out [he task without a time ¡imit.
The experiment lasted just under an houn
Results
The data from 6 subjects was eliminaled before carrying
out [he analysis because [bey had not completed the task.
We presení the results in three sections: (a) distribution of
each type of answer among the four conditional inferences;
(b) analysis of [he impact of experimental factors on
performance; and (c) study of [he influence of [he aboye-
mentioned factoes on [he subject’s conñdence.
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A) Distrihution ~ each Tvpe of aníong fue four
Conditional Itíferences
Each item offered a choice of three conclusions:
affirr,íative, ‘tegative, and nothing follows, meaning it was
not possible ¡o deduce any conclusion. Descriptive data for
all variables are shown in Figure 1.
As shown in [his figure, [he niosí frequenlly selecíed
answer In [he MP rule is Ihe affirmative conelusion, which
is logically correct. This percentage decreased parallel [o
the probability of empirical occurrence between antecedent
and consequent of [he conditional statement. Specifically,
Ihe delcrministic condition registered [he highesl percentages
of correct answers, whereas [bis frequency decreased in the
wiíhout-specific-relation condition. In [his case, [he subjects
were not able [o establish any particular link between [he
evcnts mentioned in [he rule and [he real world. Wc
registered a higher frequency of rejection of [he task in [bis
condition, which is refiected in an merCase of [he choice of
[he alternative noihiñg /bi1¿ÑÑ.
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Figure 1. Frequency (%) of endorsement of conditional inítrences
for aff¡rrnarive ¡Ip, the,í q. ___
PRAGMATIl? ASPEl?TS IN CONDITIONAL REASONING
In <he case of the MT rule, Ihe most frequently selected
answer was [he negative conclusion, which, in [his case,
was correct. However, tlie percentage of subjects who
reached the logically correct answer was less [han for the
MP rule. Despite this. the same decreasing progression was
observed lhroughoul the three conditions of enipirical
occurrence: determinis<ic-probabilistic-without specific
relation. Thus, in MT, the deterministie condition xvas also
the one that registered a greater percentage of subjects who
chose [be corred answer, followed by [he probabilistie
condition.
The correct answer was chosen most frequently with the
MP and MT rules, according ¡o [be entena of Formal Logie
(an affírmative conclusion for MP and a negative conclusion
for MT).
In the rules of AC and IDA, the condition where [he
greatest percentage of correct selections occurred was <he
without-specific-relaíion one. l-lowever. when <he empirical
occurrence was detenministie or probabilistie, there was an
menease in [he lendency [o make biconditional in<erpretations
of the s[atement, which was reflected in an increase iii [be
choice of affirmalive ant! negative answers, respectively.
(See Figure 1.)
Tbus, when [he subjec<s reasoned about AC or DA rules,
when [here was no empinical relation between [he antecedent
and [he consequent. they mainly chose [he answer [bat .stated
that no conclusion could be deduced from [he premises, which
was the correct alternative according [o Logie. 1-lowever. when
[he statement expressed a deterministie or probabilistie
empirical relation, [here were differences between both rules
Table 1
Percentage of
(Al? and IDA) with regard <o <he most frequently selected
type of answen When [he subjecls were asked [o reason about
Al? problems, <bey most frequently selected [he affurmative
answer, whcreas with DA problems [hey tended mainly [o
choose negative ones. This could indicate that [he increase
in [he empirical frequency of [he contení of Ihe rules was
acconipanied by an increase in [be suhjects’ tendency <o carry
out biconditional interpretations of Ihe premises. whereas in
<he case of conditions wi<hou[ specif¡c relation, [his tendency
was “blocked”, and consequently, [he subjects consklered tha[
it was not possible to deduce any conclusion. Indeed, it was
precisely <he choice of <his latter answer in [he withou[-
speciflc-relation condition which increased [he percentage of
correct answers with AC and DA rules.
In Table 1 are displayed [he percentages of [he notííi¡tg
foiiows answers selected. lii [his table, it may be seen that
[he percentages of [his alternative were greater in the
nonlogical rules (AC, IDA) <han in the logical rules (MP,
MT). In turn, [his alternative was the rnost frequently
selected when <he subjec<s reasoned about s<a[ernents wi<h
no relation between [heir elements.
8) Analysis of tizo h;tpact of Liixperiníental Factors
oit Subjects PerJbrntance
The number of corred answers of eacb subject was
added up, following the critenia of fonnal Logic. In Table
2, [be percen<age of correc[ answers is shown, for eacb <ype
of rule, wi[h regard [o [he availability and probability of
enipirical occurrence.
‘Notlíing Foiiows Respotises Selected
Detenministie Probabilis<ic Withou< specific
relation
TOTAL
MEAN
MP 2.10 <7.75 27.10 15.65
Available MT
Al?
23.95
30.2<)
28.15
35.45
44.80
55.20
32.30
40,30
DA 44.8<) 41.65 60,40 48.90
Mean 25.30 30.75 46.90 34.30
Unavailahie
MP
MT
Al?
DA
4.20
28.15
32.30
33.30
16.70
35.40
38.55
48,95
30.20
41.65
53.15
61.45
17.05
35.10
41.35
47.9<)
Mean 24.50 34.90 46.65 35.35
TOTAL MEAN 24.90 32.85 46.80
Note. MP — Modus Ponens; ML — Modus Tollens: Al? = Atfinmatinn of <he Consequent; [DA= Denial of <he An<eceden<.
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Table 2
Perceutíage of Corred Answers ¡u caclí Experhnetttai Co,ídition
De<erministic Probab¡Iistic Without specific relation TOTAL
M 3D
MP 96.85
MT 70.85
Al? 30.20
DA 44.80
6<).7<) 25.45 55.75 18.30 60.45 7.00 58.95
MI> 95.85
MT 69.80
Al? 46.85
DA 47.9<)
65.10 20,00 57.30 15.85 60,40 6.15
62.90 23.0<) 56.40 7.10 60.40 6.6<) 59.9<) 3.00
Note. MP = Modus Ponens; MT = Modus Tollens; Al? = Affirmatio¡i of <he l?onsequent: DA [Denialof <he Anteceden<,
We performed a 3 x 2 x 4 ANOVA (Probabilily of
Occurrence x Availabilily x Type of Rule). using [he
percenlage of correct answers as <he dependen< variable. We
ob<ained a significant effeet of the type of rule, F( 1.64,
77.26) = 14.14, p < .0001. with relalion lo [he number of
correct answers. The highest number of correct answers was
registered when [he subjects reasoned about MP problems
(M = 82.82%), followed by those obtained wilh MT
problenis (M = 62.85%), and DA (M = 50.86%). Finally,
<he lowest percentages of logical successes were obtained
with Al? problems (M = 43.23%). The cnrresponding
contrasts carried out subsequen[ly indicated lhat [here were
signifícant differences between MP and MT in [he number
of corred answers, E (1, 47) = 41.90, p <.0001. as well as
with regard <o <he Al? rule, E (1, 47) = 4.54, p < .001.
However, no significant differences were revealed in Ihe
number of coi-rec[ answers between thc Al? and DA rules.
Sirnilarly, a significant Probability of Empirical Occunence
x Type of Rule interaction was revealed. E (3.58, 168.42)
6.41, p < .0001. As rnay be seen in Figure 2, with <he MP
rule, whe~’ we. nre~epwH n deterniinioác rebajan wa reai~tered
[he highest number of corred answers E (1, 47) 10.75,;’
< .t)012. Specitically, we registered Ihe following deereasing
progressíon in <he number of Iogically conect answers o [he
<hrce experimental condilions: dcterniinis<ic (96.35%),
probabilistic (8 1.25%). and withuut .spcciflc relation (70.85%).
The same progressíon occurred with [he MII rule,
al[hougb [he number of corrcct answers in [he <hree leveis
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Figure 2. Interactive effec<s be<ween probability of empiuical
Available
M 3D
16.05
38.4<)
33.8<)
52.75
M 3D
Total
8 1.25
64,60
35.4<)
4 ¡.65
32,00
35.65
39.83
41.15
M 3D
7 1.9<)
54.15
55.20
61)4<)
Unavailable
42.42
43.55
42.85
44.90
83.35
63.20
40,30
4 8.95
10.30
6.9<)
¡0,80
8.2<)
17.40
56.8<)
93,45
94,00
Total
8 1.25
60.40
38.55
48.95
2,30
3?.,62
42.46
40.31
39.25
TOTAL
69.80
57.3<)
53.15
6 1.45
40.95
39.95
43.05
42.15
82.30
62.50
46.2<)
52.8<)
10.70
5.35
6.00
6.15
60.90 3.20
of empirical occurrence was lower with [he MP rule occunenee and type of rule In <he percentage of corrcc< responses.
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(70.33%, 62.5%, and 55.73%, respectively). However, wi<h
Ibe Al? and DA rules, this progression was different. With
[he Al? rule, [he orden of [he decreasing progression in [he
number of correc[ answers was [he following: wilhout
specific relation (54.18%), determinis[ic (38.53%), and
probabilistic (36.98%). The DA rule followed [he sanie orden,
(although we registered a bigher number of correct ansWers
[han in Ihe AC rule): without specific relation (60.93’/o).
de<erministic (46.35r/c), and probabilistie (45.30%).
Wc also carried ou[ 3 x 2 x 2 ANO VAs. in which [he two
flrst variables were [he sanie fagtors (Probability of Empirical
Occurrence x Availabiliíy), whereas Ihe third variable only
had two leveis, which corresponded ei<her [o [he logical rules
or [o [be nonlogical rules.
B.I.) Jnípact of experimeníal factors on subjects’
perjbrmance with. logical rules
The nesuhs of <hese ANO VAs (Probability of Empirical
Occurrence x Availability x Logical Rule) indicated that [he
probability of empinical occurrence significan[Iy influenced
[he nuniher of corred answers, F(2,46) = 9.894, p < .0001.
Thene were significant differences belween [he detenministie
condition. where we registered [he highest levels of correct
answers, and [he other two, F(I, 47) 19.638, p < .00<11.
Signif¡cant differences were also revealed in [he type of
logical rule variable, E(1, 47) = 16.49, p <.0001. Specif¡cally,
when [he subjec[s reasoned abot¡t MP rules, [he percentage
of conrect answers was higher (82.82%) [han when <bey
reasoned about MT rules (63.89%).
Table 3
Stíbjecr 1 Confidence (Meazis)
B.2.) Impa.t of experinte¡ítal factors oit subjects’
performance ivith nonlogical rules
The results of [be ANOVAs, using [he number of correct
answers in nonlogica] rules as a dependent variable, once
again showed <bat the probability of empinical occurrence
signifi cantly influenced [he numben of Iogically correet
answer~., F(1.39, 65.38) = 3.83, p < .04. When the subjects
reasoned about staternents withoul a speciflc relation be[ween
[heir elements, they chose a higher number of correct
answers (57.55%). and [he lowest percentage appeared when
they reasoned about probabilistie statemen<s (41.14%).
Subsequent conlrasts showed significant differences between
[he without-specific-relation condition and [he other two,
1(1, 47) 2.661, p < .028.
The <ype of nonlogical rule also significaníly influenced
[he number of correct answcrs, F(1, 47) = 5.05, p < .029,
with a higher percentage of correct answers registered with
the DA rule (50.86%) [hanwith [be Al? rule (43.23%).
C) Infiuíence of Experintental Factors on tite
St¡bjects Confié/ence
The subjects were asked [o indicate for each of [he itenis
[he certainty [bey felt about [be conclusion which, in Iheir
opinion, could be deduced fnom [he premises. Each one of
[he answers was marked on a seale ranging from ¡ (¡íor uf
di Yare> [o 7 (conip/etc/e vare). la Tabie 3 are displayed [he
means of [he subjects’ confidence for alí experimental
conditions.
¡ti cadí Experiníentaí Conditio,í
Deterministie Probabilistic Wi<hout specific relation TOTAL
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Available
MI’
MT
Al?
DA
6.65 ¡.00
6.30 1.45
6.25 <.45
6.20 1.45
6.30 1.15
6.15 1.65
6.2<) 1.65
6.15 <.55
6.25 1.35
6.00 ¡.40
6.15 1.55
6<15 1.40
6.4<)
6.15
6.20
6.15
0.20
0.10
0.05
0.05
TotaL 6.35 0.20 6.20 0.20 6.10 0.1<) 6.20 <1.10
Unavailable
MP
MT
Al?
DA
6.60 ¡.50
6.00 1.85
6.20 1.40
6.10 1.20
6.25 1.85
6,10 ¡.75
6.15 1.70
6.20 2.00
6.20 1.50
6.00 <.70
6.00 1,60
590 2.15
6.35
6.00
6.10
6.10
0,15
0.05
0.10
0.10
Total 6.20 0.20 6,20 0.10 6.00 0.10 6.10 0.10
TOTAL 6.20 0.15 6.00 0.10 6<10 0.10 6.15 0.10
No/e. MI> = Modus Ponens; MT Modus Tollcns; Al? Affirmation of <he l?onsequent; DA = Venial of <he Anteceden<.
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Wc performed a 3 x 2 x 4 ANO VA (Probabilitv of
Empirical Occurrence x Availabilily x Type of Rule).
Differences with regard te availability were revealed: tIte
subjects felt more certain about [he correclness of <heir
answer when they reasoned abeul available eontent (Al =
6.21), [han when <bey did so abouí unavailable conlen< (M
= 6.13). Despite [he fact <hat [he dilTerences belween [he
averages of both conditions appeared negligible, Ihe rcsul<s
of [he analyses indicaled that they were statistically
signiflcant. 14,47) = 4.9(tp < .031.
Similarly, we obíained significant difíerences in [he
cer<ainty of [he answers with regard [o <he <ype of rule,
F(2.70, ¡26.67) = 11.48,;’ < .0001. lJpon performing
subsequent conlrasts, significant differcnces werc revealed
between [he MP and [he MT rules, E(1, 47) = 24.53, p <
.0001: Ihe suhjec[s feIt more sure of their answers when
they reasoned about MP problenis [han about MT enes.
Furíhermore, the subjects were more confident when ¡hey
reasoned about any of <hese argunients (MP and MT) [han
ahout argumen<s of AC, E(1, 47) IO.99I,p <.002. Final¡y.
there were significaní differences in [he certainty of <he
answer when <he subjects reasoned abour MP, MT and Al?
rules, as compared <o DA rule, E(1, 47) = 7.677, p <.001.
The probahility of empirical occurrence also signiñcantly
influenced the subject< certainty of <heir answers, I( ¡.44.
67.63) = 5.17, p < .015. When [he subjects reasoned aboul
deterministie statements, they seemed more certain abot¡l <heir
answers (M = 6.27) [han when they reasoned about probabilistie
statements (M = 6.18). Finally, statements wi<h no enipirical
relation be<ween antecedent and consequent provoked ¡he leasí
certainty in [he subjects’ reasoning (M = 6.06). Subsequent
contrasts showed differences in [he determinislic condition
compared [o [he otber two, 1(1, 47) = 6.87. p < .014.
Discussion
We obtained significant differences in Ihe number of
corred answers, wilh regard [o [he type of rule. Correct
performance in [he four rules follows a decreasing
progression in [Ns order: MI’ - MT - DA - Al?. We obtained
the besí perforniance, [herefore, when [he subjeets reasoned
abou[ MP rules. followed by MT rules.
According [o [he thcory of mental models. [he MP
inference is casier [han Ihe MT because in <he former, <he
initial sel of modeis does nol need <o be fleshed otil [o make
[he inference. The MT inference is more difñcult because it
requires f)eshing out [he sel of models and keeping niultiple
niodels in mmd. The revised version of [he <heory predicts
[he superioriíy of MP over MT: ‘inferences xviii be made
more often if Ihe condilions for inference are met in <he
nitial inipí ici t represenlarion and lc•ss oflen i f fleshing 011<
is required” ([>2 principIe, forniulaled by Evans, 1993. p. 7).
Besides [he number of corred logical answers, we tised
answers. The greater reasoning complexity with MT and
special y, [he greater load ojí operative menio¡y, explain [he
lower degree of cert.ainty registered in MT as compared with
MP. In ¡he same way, <he subjecls select the alternative
,fhliows more frequenlly in <he MT rule <han in Ihe
This resulí may be explained within Ibe framework of
<he tbeory of mental modeis. bearing in mmd <hat ‘vben
reasoning about MT, [he explicit niodel is eliminated ant!
subjects only have Ihe implicií model on hand, which they
must develop lo be able [o generale [he correct inferenee.
Howcver, occasionally Ibis model is not developed, witb
<he direct resulí that it is nol possible lo dcduc< any
conclusion. In [he MP rules, [he percentage of subjects who
select [he alternative nothníg Jbiiows is lower. as. in [his
case, Ibe subjecs are reasoning direc<ly from <he initial
explicit model.
Ocr results also sbow [bat [he MP aud MT inferences
are made mure frequently <han Ihose of Al? and DA. These
resul<s do not suppout ei<her of [he two versions of <he theory,
according <o which the MP and <he Al? occur more oflen
[han ihose of MT and DA.
tinlike <he original version of [he theory. which predicted
a similar frequeney in <he production of MP and Al?, aud
supporting [he prediction of [he revised version. Wc registered
a higber frequency in [he MP inference [han in [he Al?.
In general, <he results obtained witb <he type of rule
variable partially support <be theory of mental modeis. and,
more so, Ihe revised version of [he theory. ‘Fo sum up: a)
MP inferences takc place more often [han [he MT. as is
posited by both versions, b) <he Mí> occurs more frequently
¡han <he Al? rule. and. in turn, <he Al? rule is produced with
a similar frequency [o [líe DA rule; bo<h results support <he
predictions of <he revised version of <he theory, bu< do not
confirm Ihe predictions of [he original version; and c) <he
subjects produce <he MP a¡id [he AC rules more often ¡han
ihe MT and ihe DA rules.
The results of <bis investigalion contirm our predictions
regarding <he imporlance of knowledge abou reasoning,
following ¡he trend revealed in previous inves[igations (Valifla,
Seoane, Gehring, eta!., 1992; Valiña, Seoane, Martín, e< al..
¡992). Wc obtained a signilicant interaclion between [he ¡ype
of rule and probabili<y of empirical occurrcnce of Ihe
s<atements. Thus, as Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1992) and
Johnson-l,aird and Byrne (1992) staíed. [he difficul<y in <he
pioductiun of [he four rules of infcrence is modula¡ed by <he
;íccessarx or probable charucter of <he reí ati un that <bey
ex¡)ress. According lo [hese aulhors, when subjecls reason
about a dco,ític or necessarv reí ation (deten i nistie). [bey
only need <o elaborate an explicit model of <he situation Lo
produce <he correct inference. However, when <¡ley reason
abnu< a probabiíisíic relation. <hcy have lo contemplate al
least txvo al<crnal.¡ ve possibi ¡ [les, gi ven ¡Lii Ibe relation may
or niay not occur Therefure, [bey have [o elaborate ah explicit
model from <he information mentionecí in [be rule, as wel¡
as a dependení variable [he subjects’ cer<ainty about Iheir as an ¡rnplicit model.
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Ihe resulís of our experimení support <his proposal.
Effec[ivcly, Ihe subjects registered [he bes< performance with
MP and MT rules with sta<ements <ha! expressed a
deterministic relation. l-lowever, wi<h MT problems,
perforniance was worse, because <be s[ruc<ure of [he rule
implies that [he subjectscould not reason directly from a single
initial explicit model. Furthermore, in Ihe MT rule, we observed
poorer performance with probabilistie relations. In [bis case,
added [o [he inherent difliculties in [he formal strucíure of
MT, is [he fact <hat Ihe probabilistie relation forces [he suhjec<
<o coníemplate various alternative modeis in order <o produce
<he conclusion.
Similarly, Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1992, experiment
3) observed [bat [he presence of a probabilistio modal verb
in sta[ements turned [he relation mío a fact [bat mighí or
might no[ occun As a consequence, in order [o reason, <he
subjects had <o elaborate an explici< niodel ([bat reveals Ihe
event occtLrrence mentioned in <he rule) and an implicit
model (that represents <he potential possibility tha< an event
may not oceur). However, [he presence of a deontio modal
verb indicaled that [bere was no possible alternative <o <he
event mentioned in Ihe statenient. In [his respect, [he
determinism in the relation guided [he subjects towards <he
construction of a single explicit model íba[ expressed [he
occurrence of 11w relation. In short, as Bycne and Johnson-
Laird (1992) pointed out, whereas a modal verb wi<h a
probabilistie charac[er requires [he elaboration of a series
of alternative modeis <bat are intrinsically hypo<hetical, <he
modal verb which expresses a relation of necessi[y brings
about <he construclion of a single simple Ihctual model.
Furtbermore, [he interaction registered between <he
probabili<y of empirical occurrence aud [he [ype of míe reveals
[hat. in the Al? and DA rules, [he lower <he possibility of
activating empirical knowledge, <he better performance will
be. These resul[s may be explained by [he existence of a bias
towards nonpropositional conclusions <bat guides subjects
towards a correct conclusion. In [his respect, [he subjects may
choose [be correct altemative simply because [he absence of
an empirical relation between <he elements of <he rule leads
them [o rejecí [he task more often, and, consequeníly, <o
answer <hat it is not possible <o arrive at a conclusion.
S<evenson and Over (1995, experiment 4) analysed Ibe
effect of <he “quality” of premises on [he production of the
AC and DA míes. These authors observed that, as contidence
decreased in <he conditional relation. reasoning with <he Al?
became more difticult, whereas it had no effeet upon <he DA
rule. Qur resul<s in [he withouí-speciñc-relaíion condition.
with AC ant! DA rules, support [bose of S<evenson and Over.
Effec<ively, [he lack oían empirical relation between [be
antecedent and <he consequen[ make performance more difficult
with Al? rules Ihan with DA rules. In general, [hese authors
explained [heir results within [he franiework of [he theory of
mental models, indica<ing tha[: “<he epistemie weights of
niental models of [he premises in an inference would help
determine [he weights of [he niental modeis of <he conclusion,
which would fix how probable or improbable [he conclusion
was thought [o be” (Stevenson & Over, p. 640).
Siniilarly. other authors (Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis. &
Rist, 1991) underlined [he importance of [he conten! of
conditional s<atemen[s on [he production of inference rules.
These authors designed an investigation thaI analyzed <he
influence of [he staíenients’fhmí and confe,ít on [he subjects’
reasoning with decontextualized condilional arguments. As
In our experimen<, <be au[bors presented [he subjects with
problems using [he four rules of conditional inference, with
<hematie content [bat expressed cause-effec< relations and
varied with regard <o [he number of “alternative causes”
and “possible causes” [bat could be derived from [he
conditional. Tbe authors also registered an interaction
beíween form and conten[, which led [beni <o characterize
human reasoning as fundanientally pragma<ic: “<he tendency
<o interpret a statemen< as a conditional or a biconditional
may exist on a continuum, varying with [he size of [he pooí
of alíernatives [bat characterize [he situation described by
Ihe cunditional’ (Cummins et al., p. 275).
lf we note <he similarity of [he probability of empirical
occurrence variable [hat we used. <be deterministie level may
be considered similar lo [he condition of a narrow relation
be[ween antecedent and consequent, so [bat <bere are no
possibLe ‘alternative causes in [he conclusion <bat is
preseníed. Qn [he contrary, we can consider [he probabilis[ic
level lo be similar [o <he condition whew [he con<ent is flexible
abou< <he possible existence of “incapaci[a<ing conditions”
that make <he presented sía[ement niore relative (or probable).
In [bis respec<, ant! according <o <he authors, [he greater <he
number of possible causes which <he subjects may produce
by acíivating [heir knowledge, <he lower [be probability of
in<erpreting <he s[a<ements as biconditionals. In conditionais
whose consequence is probable, Ihe subjecís produce MP and
MT rules less frequently [hanin delerministie statemen<s. The
subjects makc [he AC and DA inferences wi[h determinislie
statements, because they are interpreted more ofíen as
biconditionais. According [o <be authors. <he less “altemative
causes ihe subject is able [o elaborate, [he be«er <he
performance of MP, MT, Al?, and DA rules.
As <bey had predicted, Cummins et al. (1991) found a
similar interaction [o [he one we obtained be<ween form and
empirical frequency. These results confrrm [hat [he type of
inference was modulated by factors relaled <o [be activation
of knowledge, particularly, [o [he possibility of activating
‘alternative causes’ or “incapaci<aíing conditions’ from [he
s<aíenien<s. In our case, [bis influence of knowledge upon
reason¡ng is reflecíed in [he possibili<y uf activa[ing empirical
knowledge from [he empirical frequency of [he s<atements
[bat were presented. These variables delermine <líe search
for plausible conelusions elaborated from empirical
knowledge, and no< from logical or necessary conclusions
elaburated by <he activation of formal rules.
Moreover, we confirm our empirical expectations wi<h
regard lo availabili<y. As Evans (1984) stated, availabili<y
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was not sufñcient lo facilita¡.e [he production of a conditional
inference <ask, as opposed <o Pollard’s (¡982) point of view.
Qur results show [bat [he mere inclusion of available
professions in decontextualized argunienís does not improve
<he subjects’ perfonnance whcn conipared <o [he inclusion
of unavailable professions. However, <he subjecís’ degree
of conñdence about [heir ansWers increases.
None<heless, wc could not confinn one of our predictions
<nade regarding avai lability of <be scenario. Like Pollard and
Evans (1987), who proposed <he influence of con<ext-conten<
variables on reasoning, Wc expected [o regisíer a signiflcant
interaction between Ihe empirical frequency of [he staíemenís
and availabiliíy of [he seenario wbere <hey were included.
Wc boped <o ob[ain a higher nL¡mber of colTecí answers and
greater confidence about <heir answers when <he subjecis
reasoned about deíerníinistic relations, presented iii available
coníexts. Siniularly, [he poorest peiformance and lowest degree
of confidence abotut [beir ariswers would be registered when
[he subjects reasoned about sta<emen<s Wi<hout specific
relation, in unavailable contex<s. However, w’e eou¡d no!
conf¡rm Ihese predic<ions because no interaction xvas observed.
In spite of <his. in <he contexí of <his experiment, when
rcferring [o “available scenariot.,’ we are simply referring <o
conditional arguments thaI include available professions.
Perhaps <he way we manipulated <bis variable and <he Iype
of Iask presented may explain <he absence of significant
effects of [his factor on corred perforniance. It is imporlant
to underlake new investigations in the future lo see wbether
<he effect of <bis variable on reasoning is greater wben
conditional -argunients included in texts are used, which would
allow <he subjects [o elaborate a ‘mental franiework <bat is
ací.ively transfornied, with <he intention of deriving its factual
and plausible consequences from Wc ‘mental simulation’
mode” (Valiña & De Vega, 1988. p. 58).
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